Response to Janet Malek: Disability and the Duties of Parents

Posted on: May 9, 2008  |   Author: Garrett
Filed Under: Bioethics, Center for Health Law Studies Symposia, Disability   |   Comments Off

Let me begin by saying that I do not have a history of disability, I have no children who are disabled, and I myself am not disabled in any way, so perhaps my perspective is simply not as attuned to the implications of the strong position that Malek defended in her presentation (for a full discussion of Malek’s arguments see http://lawblogs.slu.edu/healthlaw?p=156). The “strong position” argues that in some situations where potential parents have the opportunity to choose between an embryo without a disability and an embryo with a disability, then the parents have the moral obligation to choose the embryo without a disability. She admitted that her interest in this topic was generated by the much publicized cases of parents who are deaf taking steps to ensure that their child is also deaf, and whether it could be argued that the parents had any moral obligation to have a child without disability. It was my opinion that Malek rather objectively defended her thesis with full understanding of the implications and arguments against her position, while her dissenters seemed to react with vehement and emotional opposition.

The most contentious issue that arose during the presentation, and during the question period that followed, was whether adopting the strong position necessarily results in a devaluation of those currently living with disability. An additional aspect of this critique was that the strong position defines all people living with disability solely by their disability, without taking into account the entirety of the person. At the heart of this question is really how we should define the obligations of a parent. If we accept that a parent has the moral obligation to provide their children with the most possible opportunities, then the strong position seems to be a logical corollary to this stance. Few would argue that parents do indeed have the obligation to provide their already born children with the most possible opportunities, yet when this stance is rephrased in the form of the strong position it suddenly becomes an extremely contentious issue. I cannot disagree that if the strong position does indeed devalue those currently living with disability, then this is a quite offensive stance. So perhaps we simply have to accept that different duties are owed to potential children than to children who have already been born.

However, I would have to agree with Ms. Malek that the strong position does not necessarily devalue those currently living with disability. The strong position does not even take a position regarding the future value of children living with disability, but instead is only a statement regarding the moral obligations of parents. It states that parents simply have the same obligation when choosing a particular embryo from a group that could be implanted, that they do when rearing their children who have already been born – to provide those children with the most opportunities possible. This does not necessarily imply that those with disability have less value than those without, but instead is merely the recognition that disability is a sort of limitation on opportunities. This is not a Gattaca reality where only those who have been genetically altered are normal, but is instead a rejection of the ultra politically correct stance that disability itself does not exist but instead there are only those who are differently abled.